

DOES THE FRONT LINE REFLECT THE PARTY LINE? THE POLITICIZATION OF PUNISHMENT AND PRISON OFFICERS' PERSPECTIVES TOWARDS INCARCERATION

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Imprisonment policy has become increasingly politicized since the mid-1960s, but we do not yet know the consequence of this shift for the professional orientations of prison workers. In this article, we use original surveys of prison officers in California and Minnesota to assess whether and how partisan identification and the politicization of crime policy predict officers' conceptualizations of the purpose and function of prisons. Results show that individual partisanship is associated with officers' attitudes, but this is conditional on state context. Along with deepening understandings about the determinants of street-level bureaucrats' perspectives, this article advances knowledge about how the broader political environment might shape the attitudes of front-line workers. This is important because prison officers' perspectives affect their workplace behaviour with consequences for staff-prisoner relationships, policy implementation and the routine operations of penal facilities.

Keywords: politics of punishment, imprisonment, street-level bureaucracy, prison officer

Introduction

With the publication in 1980 of Michael Lipsky's groundbreaking book, *Street Level Bureaucracy*, scholars gained a new appreciation of public sector employees. It is now generally accepted that successful implementation of public policies depends on the actions of those responsible for implementing them. Police, social workers, prison officers and teachers use their discretion to interpret and apply policy directives—and how they do so has major implications for bureaucratic outcomes. As Lipsky (1980: xii) remarks, 'the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively *become* the public policies they carry out.'

Researchers in several disciplines thus seek to understand street-level bureaucrats' attitudes about their jobs, bosses, clients and other related issues because these orientations can—and often do—affect their behaviour (Lipsky 1980; Haney 1996; Lynch 1998; Robinson and Ugwuoke 2012; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003; Terrill et al. 2003; Meir and Nicholson-Crotty 2006; Liebling 2008; Maynard-Moody and Portillo 2010; Liebling et al. 2011). This understanding of a strong relationship between worker dispositions and bureaucratic practice has energized a growing literature on the orientations of prison officers—a particularly large class of street-level bureaucrats that play a key role in implementing criminal justice policies. In a critique and elaboration of

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the ‘new penology’ thesis that draws on street-level bureaucracy scholarship, Cheliotis (2006: 323), argues for attention to ‘the panoply of personal values and idiosyncratic meanings that individual decision-makers (i.e. prison staff) bring to their decisions (or their non-decisions for that matter) and *which eventually coalesce to sustain, form or reform organizational routines*’ (emphasis added).

In this vein, extant studies have found a variety of important individual- and organizational-level correlates of officer attitudes, including race, gender, tenure, age, education, prison security level and prison type (e.g. male versus female, public versus private) (Jurik 1985; Cullen et al. 1989; Cullen et al. 1993; Crewe et al. 2011; Lerman 2013). This is important, given that officer attitudes and emotions are key factors in policy implementation, prisoner quality of life and, ultimately, organizational legitimacy. As Liebling (2008: 118), arguably the foremost scholar of prison workers, argues:

Staff attitudes, in other words, are linked to behavior, as studies of police culture have indicated, as well as to prisoner-related outcomes. Culture, then, is related to the likelihood of implementation of new policies, as well as to outcomes for prisoners... Staff attitudes translate into regime qualities that can make the difference between a survivable experience of imprisonment and an unbearable one.

In this article, we build on existing literature by examining the relationship among state context, political identity and prison officer attitudes. We analyse original survey data gathered from prison officers working in two states with differing political contexts—California and Minnesota—to understand if officers’ views on the purpose of imprisonment and the provision of rehabilitative programmes vary based on partisan identification, an independent variable that until now has received scant attention. In addition, we ask: does the predictive power of partisan identification differ across states in which the political salience of imprisonment differs?

There are empirical and theoretical reasons to predict a strong association between partisan identification and officer attitudes. Various theoretical perspectives—continuity theory (Atchley 2000), importation theory (Irwin and Cressey 1962) and representative bureaucracy theory (Mosher 1968)—support the prediction that prison officers enter the workplace with identities, values and orientations that affect how they understand and evaluate workplace issues and experiences. Partisanship is arguably one important dimension of these pre-existing orientations that shape officers’ attitudes on the job. Further, we would predict that the relationship between party identification and officer orientation is stronger in states where imprisonment is more politically salient than in states where it is less so. In these contexts, partisan elites send diverging signals to their followers, resulting in polarized attitudes among the mass public (Zaller 1992). In other words, we would expect the strength of the relationship between partisanship and officer attitudes to vary according to state-level political context.

Conversely, there are other reasons to predict no significant relationship between political party identification and officer attitudes. Street-level bureaucracy theory highlights organizational factors, such as resources, that affect workers’ attitudes and discretionary behaviour (Lipsky 1980). The ‘work role’ perspective within the sociology of punishment similarly maintains that formal and informal training, daily interactions, subcultural norms and values, and institutionalized relationships shape employee orientations more than demographic or other individual-level factors (Jacobs and Retsky 1980; Crawley 2004). To the extent that employees in different facilities or across state prison systems have similar work roles, we should expect them to develop similar

attitudes. In this case, we should not expect variation in attitudes based on either political party identification or state political context.

Our data allow us to adjudicate between these rival hypotheses. Moreover, because we surveyed at a host of prisons and within two state prison systems (32 prison institutions in California and 8 in Minnesota), we can determine if political identification has different effects across facilities and political contexts. Specifically, because the political salience of imprisonment issues and the relative politicization of incarceration are more intense in California than Minnesota, we might reasonably expect partisanship to be a stronger predictor in the former state context than the latter. This cross-state analysis is unique; to our knowledge, this is the first study to examine officer attitudes between states using a common survey instrument.

Partisanship, Politicization and Imprisonment

Prison is fundamentally a political institution. The state is charged with ensuring domestic order and public safety, and it has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force (including confinement in prisons) (Weber 2004). Politicians make laws that send people to prison, allocate funds for building and operating facilities, appoint administrators such as wardens and define the official rationales for putting people behind bars. Politicians choose whether offenders do time in public or private prisons. In jurisdictions that have prison officer unions, politicians approve (or do not approve) labour contracts, defining compensation and establishing rules regarding employee–employer relations. Practically speaking, politicians always have been at least minimally involved with nearly all aspects of imprisonment.

Incarceration (and criminal punishment in general) is political in another way: politicians use penal institutions to shore up legitimacy. This fact has been especially apparent in the United States since the mid-1960s, when lawmakers and political aspirants put ‘law and order’ at the centre of their campaigns and governing strategies. Republican politicians fueled the politicization of punishment in the 1960s as part of a broader effort to win over white democrats by getting ‘tough on crime’, which implicitly meant getting tough on urban blacks (Beckett 1999). As ‘law and order’ became a winning issue for Republicans, high-profile Democrats too (who quickly tired of losing political capital as their opponents labelled them ‘soft on crime’) eventually took a hardline stance on punishment (Beckett 1999). From the late 1980s forward, there was considerable convergence between the two main political parties regarding some aspects of penal policy (Hagan 2010).

Yet, although both leading Democratic and Republican politicians have ‘governed through crime’ since at least the early 1990s (Simon 2007), there remain important party differences on questions of crime and punishment. In a thorough review, Jacobs and Jackson (2010: 146) conclude, ‘Robust evidence supports claims for an independent positive relationship between Republican political strength and imprisonment rates.’ They describe similar associations between Republican dominance and financing for prison expansion and capital punishment (both in terms of legality and quantity of executions). These and other studies reveal consistent variation between the main political parties, with Republicans typically campaigning as ‘tougher’ on crime than Democrats, and following through with their more punitive campaign pledges once in office (Jacobs and Jackson 2010).

Partisans in the mass public reflect these distinctions (see Figure 1). In a nationally representative survey of Americans,¹ Republicans were more likely than Democrats to believe that the top priority for crime control should be either punishment or enforcement, rather than prevention or rehabilitation ($\chi^2 = 34.405, p < 0.001$). They were more likely to say that they most want their tax money to go towards building more prisons, rather than funding programmes that try to prevent crime ($\chi^2 = 42.91, p < 0.001$). They were more likely to say that prison time and other punishments for crime are too lenient, as opposed to either too harsh or about right ($\chi^2 = 33.793, p < 0.001$). And Republicans were less likely than Democrats to say that African Americans ($\chi^2 = 83.340, p < 0.001$), Hispanics ($\chi^2 = 65.149, p < 0.001$) and the poor ($\chi^2 = 46.8, p < 0.001$) are generally treated worse when sentenced than others convicted of similar crime.

The partisan divide on prison issues is not the same throughout the United States, though. This is typified by a comparison of California and Minnesota. For the better part of the last 50 years, imprisonment and related matters such as sentencing laws have been major political issues in the Golden State (Zimring et al. 2001; Barker 2009; Page 2011). This has not been true in Minnesota, where politics does not play nearly as major of a role in structuring the state's penal landscape.

The respective platforms of the primary political parties in each state provide a window into these differences. Between 2000 and 2010, California Democrats issued six political platforms. All of the documents advocate parsimonious use of




FIG. 1 Partisan differences in the mass public.

¹ Data are from the National Center for State Courts Poll #2006-NCSC: Sentencing Attitudes, a telephone survey of national sample of 1,502 adults conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International for the National Center for State Courts, 6 March to 9 April 2006.

imprisonment—reserving prison beds for serious and violent offenders while limiting incarceration for non-serious and non-violent criminals (particularly drug offenders). They also argue that rehabilitation should be a central purpose of imprisonment.

In contrast, the California Republican Party issued three platforms between 2000 and 2010. The sections on ‘crime and justice’ could hardly be more different. They advocate prison expansion, harsher prison conditions and ‘stiffer penalties’ for a range of offenders, including ‘drug users’. The platforms do not express support for rehabilitation as a purpose of imprisonment, though Republican documents do indicate support for basic prison work and education programmes.

While California Republicans in practice have maintained ideological consistency on penal matters, the state’s Democrats have been less rigid, particularly concerning sentencing laws. Though generally less enthusiastic than Republicans about ‘tough on crime’ legislation, Democratic lawmakers supported Three Strikes law and similar measures in the 1990s (Zimring et al. 2001; Page 2011). However, the Democratic Party has called for progressive reforms such as formation of a ‘non-partisan sentencing commission to review inequitable sentencing laws’ [California Democratic Party (CDP) 2010: 3]; limiting the scope and effects of the state’s Three Strikes law (CDP 2010: 4) and ‘decreasing penalties for minor drug dealers and other victimless crimes, making the punishment fit the crime’ (CDP 2008: 4). Relative to the state’s Republican Party, then, California’s Democratic Party has more consistently backed rehabilitation as a central goal of imprisonment and an effective means for reducing recidivism.

In general, the Minnesota Republican Party (MRP) is somewhat more punitive and less supportive of rehabilitation than the Democratic-Farm-Labor (DFL) Party (the leading Democratic Party in Minnesota). Yet what is most striking about the Minnesota party platforms is how little either party says about imprisonment relative to California. In fact, the platform of the DFL Party does not mention prisons at all. It does state, however: ‘We advocate strong law enforcement policies combined with vigorous crime prevention programs that emphasize education, treatment and rehabilitation’ (DFL 2010: 3). Unlike the DFL, the MRP *does* discuss the purpose of imprisonment in its platform: ‘We support building whatever new prisons are necessary to protect the public by incarcerating violent criminals. Prisons are for the protection of the public and the punishment of criminals and should not be designed for recreation.’ About prison-based programmes, the platform only states: ‘as a condition of parole, an inmate must have participated in Adult Basic Education’ (MRP 2008: 8).

This gap in the attention given to prison-related issues reflects the fact that the political salience (or *politicization*) of imprisonment varies between states. In some states, like California, the parties define themselves in opposition to each other over criminal justice issues, including imprisonment. In others, like Minnesota, incarceration is just not a major political issue. As a result, parties (and partisans) within the state have not staked out strong (and potentially divergent) positions on the issue.

Table 1 summarizes a variety of institutional explanations for this difference in politicization. In California, the passage of a determinate sentencing law in 1976 made sentencing a routinely contested political issue (Zimring et al. 2001). The political nature of carceral issues in California is also due to the initiative process. Once a criminal justice or other initiative qualifies for the ballot (and even sometimes before it qualifies), there are intense, extremely costly public battles (Barker 2009). The state’s political parties generally take stances on criminal justice (and all other) propositions, and

TABLE 1 *Politicization factors*

	Sentencing structure	Prison officer union	Ballot initiative	Interest group politics	Prison overcrowding	Corrections spending
California	Determinate	Independent, highly political	Yes	Extensive	Yes	Very high
Minnesota	Guidelines	Affiliated, not very political	No	Limited	No	Moderate

voters are inundated with television, radio, internet and direct mail advertisements. In short, the initiative process intensely politicizes and includes voters in the penal policy-making process (Zimring et al. 2001; Barker 2009).

The existence and aggressiveness of well-financed criminal justice interest groups also politicizes punishment in California (Zimring et al. 2001; Page 2011). The Golden State has the nation's most powerful and successful prison officers union, the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA), which is extremely active in struggles over penal policy. Additionally, this labour union helped create (and continues to finance) two enormously influential crime victims' organizations (Zimring et al. 2001; Page 2011). The presence of these well-organized and well-financed interest groups motivates and enhances the political salience of and conflict over criminal justice issues (Savelsberg 1992).

Another important explanation for politicization in California is overcrowding. Since at least the mid-1990s, political figures have fiercely debated how to deal with the state's overflowing penal facilities—e.g. building more prisons, improving rehabilitation, privatization or parole reform (Page 2011). A related issue is the expense of imprisonment. In 2007, California spent 8.6 per cent (\$8.8 billion) of its total general fund expenditures on corrections (Pew Center on the States 2008). Since California's corrections budget ballooned in the 1990s, public officials have fought publicly and sometimes virulently over how to decrease spending on incarceration and related functions (e.g. parole).

A similar combination of factors makes imprisonment less politically charged in Minnesota. First, Minnesota does not have an initiative process. State voters do not participate directly in making penal laws and so public battles over crime and punishment are less visible and less intense. Second, Minnesota has a sentencing commission, an independent body that sets the state's sentencing guidelines. As Tonry (1996) notes, sentencing commissions in general and Minnesota's in particular are specifically designed to de-politicize sentencing. Third, Minnesota does not have the type of crime-related interest group politics that exists in California. Although professional associations (e.g. district attorneys, associations), labour unions and victims' groups do exist in Minnesota, they do not engage in high-profile, high-stakes political gamesmanship—as do the interest groups in California.² Finally, the state's prisons are nowhere near as crowded or expensive as those in states like California. Minnesota's sentencing commission has a mandate to keep the prison population from exceeding 95 per cent capacity (Frase 2005). This, in turn, contributes to keeping Minnesota's spending on

² To the best of our knowledge, there are no academic studies about interest groups and criminal punishment in Minnesota. These comments are therefore based on authors' observations and informal conversations with numerous stakeholders in Minnesota.

corrections down. In 2007, Minnesota spent 2.7 per cent (\$438 million) of total general fund expenditures on its corrections system, which was the second lowest in the nation (Pew Center on the States 2008).

Although there are political battles over crime and punishment issues (e.g. drug penalties and sex offenders) in both states, imprisonment policy is simply not the hot-button political subject in Minnesota that it is in California. Unlike in California, political parties in Minnesota are not routinely forced to address prison issues such as overcrowding, sentencing-related ballot initiatives, court decisions on prison conditions and enormous spending on corrections. The result is a decreased salience of imprisonment as a defining point of divergence between the major political parties in Minnesota relative to California.

Hypotheses

Is state-level variation in the politics of imprisonment reflected in prison officers' attitudes about the purpose of imprisonment, rehabilitation and related matters? There are empirical and theoretical justifications to predict that partisanship and political context significantly affect officer attitudes about the *ideological goals of imprisonment*. There are also solid reasons for predicting that partisanship and politicization are less predictive of officers' attitudes about *inmate access to rehabilitation programmes*, a distinct dimension of officers' attitudes towards rehabilitation (Lerman and Page 2012). In this section, we provide a brief review of extant literature that informs our hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Our first prediction is that there is a significant relationship between political party identification and officer attitudes about the purpose of imprisonment in both states.

Prison officers gain direct insight into prison policy through their professional work. However, they are also individual citizens, whose attitudes and beliefs are shaped by their positions and participation in the broader social and political world (e.g. Jurik 1985; Whitehead and Lindquist 1989; Van Voorhis et al 1991; Jackson and Ammen 1996; Britton 1997). We thus predict that political identification affects officers' attitudes about imprisonment independent of correctional organization and the nature of prison work. After all, officers (like other citizens) are exposed to the broad stream of political messages and cues related to prison policy that infuse their political context. In addition, prison workers are likely to be more attuned to prison-related politics than other citizens, given their personal stake in this policy domain (Iyengar et al. 2008).

As discussed above, the Democratic and Republican parties in both California and Minnesota differ in respect to the goals of incarceration. In each state, the Democratic Party is more supportive of a rehabilitative approach to imprisonment, while the Republican Party is a stronger proponent of a retributive approach. We expect partisan correctional officers in each state to likewise differ.

Congruence between political parties and their respective partisans occurs in two ways. First, partisans in the electorate receive cues from political elites that inform their political attitudes (Campbell et al. 1960). Citizens are most likely to both receive and accept information from those elites who match their partisan affiliation (Zaller 1992), and the effect of party identification on policy views is strongest among the most attentive (Green et al. 2002, chapter 8; Zaller 1992). Indeed, John Zaller argues that even when 'citizens are well informed, they react mechanically to political ideas on the basis of external cues about their partisan implications' (1992: 45). A second way congruence

occurs is through partisan sorting; individuals may choose the political party that best fits with their ideological orientations and policy preferences (Erikson and Tedin 1981; Sundquist 1983; Adams 1997: 729; Carmines and Stanley 1990; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Putz 2002). This ‘issue-based party conversion’ (Layman et al. 2006) is most likely to occur among people to whom an issue is particularly important and who are aware of the relative positions of the two major parties (Carsey and Layman 2006). Both these mechanisms lead us to expect officers in each state will differ along party lines in their attitudes towards imprisonment.

Hypothesis 2: We predict that the relationship between party identification and officer attitudes in California is stronger than in Minnesota.

As Melossi (2001) argues, social control is ‘embedded’ in particular cultural contexts. We would argue that punishment also is embedded in certain *political* contexts—in this case, political contexts that vary across states. More specifically, we posit that penal institutions are situated within specific political environments that affect officers’ orientations. In a state like California, which has a neo-populist political culture (Barker 2009) and intensely political and partisan struggles over imprisonment, we would expect officers to view their work through a political party framework. By comparison, in Minnesota, the political party platforms are far more convergent and imprisonment is far less politicized. So, in this context, our expectation is that partisans’ attitudes will likewise follow suit.

Another reason we expect to see greater divergence between officers on the basis of party identification in California is that officers in that state are members of a union that routinely engages in high-stakes political struggles over sentencing and prison policies. Officers therefore receive both explicit and implicit encouragement from their union to view work-related matters through a political lens (Page 2011). Minnesota officers, by contrast, are members of a union that largely abstains from political contests over penal policy. In all, we expect that political party identification predicts officer attitudes more strongly in California than in Minnesota.

Hypothesis 3: We expect that political partisanship will not significantly predict officers’ attitudes towards the provision of rehabilitation programmes to inmates in either state.

Our final prediction is that there is no meaningful relationship between political party identification and officer support for the provision of basic rehabilitation programmes to inmates. There are two reasons for this expectation. First, as previously discussed, the Democratic and Republican parties in both states express at least mild support for prisoners having access to basic rehabilitative programmes, such as education, work training and chemical dependency. In general, the states’ respective Republican Parties do not oppose prisoners having an opportunity to better themselves. In turn, we expect to see little variation on this dimension between officers who identify as Republican and Democrat.

In addition, prison officers are not only members of political parties but they are also members of workplace organizations—prisons—that have particular patterns of behaviour, interactions and cultures (Sykes 1958; Sparks et al. 1996). As extant studies demonstrate, prison officers’ main responsibility is custody, not treatment (Jacobs and Retsky 1980; Liebling 2000; Crawley 2004; Crewe 2011). Officers are generally skeptical of efforts to make imprisonment rehabilitative—i.e. to privilege corrections over custody. However, so long as the operation of rehabilitation programmes does not jeopardize institutional security, officers are generally willing to support them (or at least not

strongly oppose them). In addition, officers may back prison programming because it actually assists in maintaining order within the prison, by giving inmates a productive way to fill their time (DiJulio 1991; Logan 1993; Lin 2000). Taken together, we would hypothesize that officers in both California and Minnesota, regardless of political party, express generally favourable attitudes about the provision of programmes to inmates.

Data and Methods

In order to measure the professional norms of prison officers, we rely on data from two large-scale surveys of prison officers, which we designed and administered: the California Correctional Officer Survey (CCOS) and the Minnesota Correctional Officer Survey (MNCOS). The CCOS, conducted in 2006, measured the attitudes and experiences of 5,775 prison officers working in all 33 of California's adult state prisons. The MNCOS was administered in 2007 and gathered data on 911 officers in all of Minnesota's eight state prisons.³ The CCOS sample was obtained through the membership database of the CCPOA. The California sample was drawn from only those individuals currently employed and excludes those who are not rank-and-file officers (i.e. parole agents, counselors and higher-ranking custody personnel). The MNCOS sample was obtained through the membership database of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the union that represents prison officers in Minnesota. As with the California sample, the Minnesota sample includes only currently employed rank-and-file officers.

The California survey achieved a response rate of about 33 per cent, while the Minnesota survey had a higher response of 51 per cent. These response rates are comparable to or higher than previous studies of prison officers and are within the bounds of expectation for mail-administered surveys (see, for instance, Kaplowitz et al. 2004).⁴ As Figure 2 shows, respondent demographics in both states were generally representative of the population. Moreover, though response rates varied by institution, no prison had to be excluded from analysis due to a lack of respondents.⁵

The surveys asked a variety of questions to determine officers' attitudes towards both the ideological and practical dimensions of imprisonment. The first set of questions asked officers about the philosophy they believe should undergird incarceration. Survey questions probed relative agreement or disagreement with the statements: 'Rehabilitation should be a central goal of incarceration' and 'The job of a prison is to keep the public safe, not to help inmates'. An additional question on this dimension—'Do you feel that the purpose of a prison is rehabilitation, punishment or both?'—allowed officers to express relative support for a rehabilitation or punitive ideology, as well as express whether they see these as non-mutually exclusive.

The second set of questions is concerned with more practical aspects of rehabilitation: namely, the provision of specific programmes to inmates. Here, officers were asked for their

³ Both surveys were sent to officers' home addresses in order to assure confidentiality. A cover letter offered the usual assurances about subject anonymity and confidentiality, provided background on the study and researchers and gave a contact phone number in case of any questions or concerns.

⁴ We adhered to best practices for maximizing response rates, including minimizing survey length; providing pre-notification; noting sponsorship; making multiple follow-up attempts; including return envelopes with postage and offering incentives (Yamarino et al. 1991). That our survey samples approximate their respective state populations on all available demographics should help to assuage concern about non-response bias.

⁵ Additionally, there is some evidence that higher response rates do not consistently improve substantive results drawn from survey data (Curtin et al. 2000; Keeter et al. 2000; Merkle and Edelman 2002, 2009; Langer 2003; Keeter et al. 2006).




FIG. 2 Demographics of the CCOS and MNCOS. Race sums to more than 100% due to some respondents identifying more than one racial category. Sample N California = 5,775. Population N California = 21,243. Sample N Minnesota = 911. Population N Minnesota = 1,918.

relative agreement that 'Inmates who want it should have access to academic training at least up to and including GED [General Educational Development] preparation'; 'Inmates who want it should have access to academic training at the college level'; 'Inmates who want it should have access to vocational training' and 'Inmates who want it should have access to drug and alcohol treatment'.

Our key indicator of partisanship is measured by a question asking 'Do you consider yourself a: Republican, Independent, Democrat, Other Party, No Party?' We likewise asked officers to indicate their race, gender, age, education and tenure with the state's Department of Corrections. We posed a series of questions concerning perceptions of institutional security at the specific prison where they work, including the percentage of inmates officers consider very dangerous (versus dangerous or not dangerous), the percentage of gang-affiliated inmates, the likelihood that a staff member will be assaulted and the frequency of violent incidents of any kind. Finally, we included two questions related to institutional management, captured by agreement with the statements: 'I receive the kind of training that I need to perform my job well' and 'When I have a problem at work, there is someone I can talk to who will really help me to solve it.' (Full question wordings for all survey items are detailed in Appendix A.) Additional controls are measured with administrative data. These include the security level(s) of an officer's institution, whether the institution houses male or female inmates or inmates of both genders, and the demographic composition of officers who work at the institution.

Results

The purpose of imprisonment

We start by comparing the relative punitiveness of officers across the two states. To do this, we create two indices. The *Ideology Index* combines the three questions tapping support for rehabilitation as a correctional philosophy. The *Programs Index* includes

our measures of support for the provision of four different types of rehabilitation programmes. Both are additive linear indices and are scaled from 0 to 1.⁶

Comparing mean scores on each index, we find no significant differences in support for rehabilitation programmes across states. California officers have an average score of 0.71 [standard deviation (SD) = 0.16] on the *Programs Index*, compared to a mean of about 0.72 (SD = 0.15) for officers in Minnesota ($F = 0.7$, $p = 0.4$). In contrast, on the *Ideology Index*, there is a clear difference between California and Minnesota. Officers in California have a mean score of 0.50 (with an SD of 0.17), almost exactly between the two ends of the index. By comparison, officers in Minnesota, on average, are roughly 8 percentage points higher on the scale, at about 0.58 (SD = 0.16). On this measure of officers' orientations towards the purpose of imprisonment, officers in California are thus significantly more punitive than officers in Minnesota ($F = 151$, $p < 0.001$).

In addition to assessing whether officers in the two states vary in their attitudes towards imprisonment, we are interested in examining the relationship between officer attitudes and partisanship. In California, officers who identify as Republican are less supportive of a rehabilitation philosophy than those who identify as either a Democrat or an Independent (see Figure 3). Compared to 40.8 per cent of Republicans who believe rehabilitation should be a central goal of a prison, 47 per cent of Independents and 58 per cent of Democrats voice this sentiment ($\chi^2 = 100.879$, $p < 0.001$). Similarly, when asked whether the 'purpose of a prison is rehabilitation, punishment or both', about 12.7 per cent of Republicans, 14.4 per cent of Independents and 20.2 per cent of Democrats replied that rehabilitation should dominate ($\chi^2 = 53.170$, $p < 0.001$). And in response to the statement 'The job of a prison is to keep the public safe, not to help inmates,' Republicans were significantly more likely than either Independents




FIG. 3 Support for rehabilitation ideology, by state and party.

⁶ Inter-item correlations and Cronbach's α are high on both indices and in both states.

or Democrats to agree (72.5 per cent, 68.2 per cent and 57.6 per cent, respectively) ($\chi^2 = 86.667, p < 0.001$).

By comparison, there is little relationship between partisanship and support for rehabilitation as a correctional ideology in Minnesota. Democrats, Independents and Republicans working in Minnesota prisons are equally likely to support the position that 'rehabilitation should be a central goal of incarceration' and Democrats are no more or less likely than are Independents or Republicans to agree that the purpose of a prison should be rehabilitation or that it should be still punishment but more rehabilitation. There is a difference on whether 'The job of a prison is to keep the public safe, not to help inmates.' About 57.6 per cent of Democrats, 65.1 per cent of Independents and 69.1 per cent of Republicans agree with this statement ($\chi^2 = 7.589, p < 0.05$).

The story changes somewhat on the set of questions related to support for specific types of rehabilitation programmes (see Figure 4). On the two types of programmes for which support in the aggregate is highest (academic training up to and including GED and drug and alcohol treatment) there are no partisan differences in either state. In response to the question of whether 'inmates who want it should have access to academic training at least up to and including GED preparation', officers who identify with each party hold similar attitudes. Levels of support for drug and alcohol programmes are also equivalent across party lines.

In Minnesota, there are also no partisan differences on whether the other two programme types (vocational training and academic training at the college level) should be offered. By comparison, officers in California are somewhat more divided along party lines in their support for these programmes: Democrats (87.7 per cent) are more likely than Independents (83.9 per cent) or Republicans (82.3 per cent) to support offering




FIG. 4 Support for rehabilitation programmes, by state and party.

vocational training ($\chi^2 = 18.611, p < 0.001$), and relative to 61 per cent of Democrats and 58.1 per cent of Independents, only 51.8 per cent of Republicans support providing academic training at the college level ($\chi^2 = 33.495, p < 0.001$).

These results hold in multivariate analyses. In order to systematically examine how these relationships vary across states, we first estimate a set of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. In these analyses, we regress each of our dependent variable indices on political partisanship, as well as a host of both demographic and institutional control variables. We also include an interaction term, allowing us to assess whether the effect of partisanship on officers' attitudes varies by state.

In models predicting the *Ideology Index*, the coefficient on the interaction between state and Republican is statistically significant ($b = 0.04, SE = 0.02, p < 0.05$), showing a clear difference in the role of partisanship across these different state contexts. In California, there is a strong negative slope between predicted values of the *Ideology Index* and party identification. In comparison, the relationship between ideology and political party identification in Minnesota is essentially flat. In contrast to the results for ideology, the coefficient on the interaction term in a model predicting support for programmes is not significant ($b = 0.01, SE = 0.01$). On this dimension, partisanship functions similarly across states. In both California and Minnesota, the relationship between party and the *Programs Index* is weak or non-significant.

A series of hierarchical linear models (HLM) help to further elucidate the factors that predict support for rehabilitation in each state.⁷ These models allow us to take into account the fact that officers are not only embedded in state contexts, but also within particular prison institutions that may shape their attitudes in significant ways. We estimate separate models for each state, predicting support for each dimension of rehabilitation—the *Ideology Index* and the *Programs Index*.⁸ Control variables are the same as those in the OLS model described above.

As Table 2 shows, officers' attitudes towards both *Ideology* and *Programs* are associated with features of the particular institution at which an officer works, and the direction and magnitude of these patterns are similar across states. Specifically, we find that officers in both states who express greater levels of concern about physical violence against staff are less likely to support rehabilitation as a correctional ideology. Perceptions that a greater proportion of inmates are 'very dangerous' are similarly predictive of lower support for rehabilitation programmes in both states. In California, other measures of perceived violence are also associated with both dimensions of support.

Officers' perceptions of workplace training and support are likewise associated with their attitudes towards rehabilitation. Officers in both states who agree that they can find help when they need it to resolve work-related problems express more support for rehabilitation as an ideology. In California, these perceptions are also associated with support for rehabilitation programmes. Also in California, officers who say they receive sufficient job training appear more supportive on both dimensions of rehabilitation.

As has been shown in other studies (Jurik 1985; Cullen et al. 1989; Cullen et al. 1993; Crewe et al. 2011; Lerman 2013), individual demographics are predictive of support for rehabilitation, and this is true in our models. In both states, older and female officers

⁷ For detailed treatments of HLM, see Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) and Woolridge et al. (2001).

⁸ For simplicity, all variables are first modelled as fixed effects. In later specifications, the effects of race and gender were allowed to vary across prisons.

TABLE 2 Predicting officer support for rehabilitation, by state (HLM)

	Ideology Index		Programs Index	
	California	Minnesota	California	Minnesota
Partisanship				
Republican	-0.05 (0.01)***	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.02)
Independent	-0.03 (0.01)***	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)**	0.02 (0.01) [#]
Officer demographics				
White	-0.03 (0.01)***	0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.02)
Female	0.04 (0.01)***	0.02 (0.01) [#]	0.03 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.01)
Age	0.01 (0.00)**	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.00) [#]	0.00 (0.01)
Education	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01) [#]	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
Tenure	-0.01 (0.00)***	-0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)*	-0.01 (0.00)*
Institutional security				
% of inmates who are very dangerous	-0.00 (0.00)*	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)**
Likelihood that staff will be assaulted	-0.01 (0.00)**	-0.02 (0.01)**	-0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)
Frequency of violent incidents	-0.01 (0.00)**	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00) [#]	0.01 (0.01)
% of inmates in gangs	-0.00 (0.00)*	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)
Institutional management				
Officers receive sufficient job training	0.01 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)
Help is available for work-related problems	0.01 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.00)**	0.01 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)
Institutional characteristics				
Security level	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
Female institution	-0.01 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)**	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
% White officers	-0.00 (0.00)***	0.13 (0.14)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.14 (0.16)
Intercept	0.65 (0.03)***	0.56 (0.06)***	0.74 (0.03)***	0.72 (0.06)***
BIC	-3,157.128	-481.903	-3,797.575	-527.775
ICC	3.7	5.4	3.9	1.9
Number of institutions	32	8	32	8

Table shows results of two-level hierarchical linear models with officers nested within institution. Models are estimated separately for each state, and separately to predict each index.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

are more supportive of rehabilitation (though the effects of age do not reach statistical significance in Minnesota). Interestingly, race works quite distinctly across states, as well as across dimensions. In California, white officers are less supportive of rehabilitation as a correctional ideology than are racial minorities, and the higher the percentage of white officers working at the prison institution overall, the less supportive an individual officer is likely to be on this dimension. Conversely, white officers in California are somewhat more supportive of rehabilitation programmes relative to minority officers. In Minnesota, by comparison, we do not find a significant relationship between either racial identification or racial composition and support for rehabilitation. This may be explained by the racial homogeneity of officers in Minnesota relative to the more diverse California officer workforce, though we cannot directly test this supposition here.

Finally, as in the OLS regressions and as predicted, the hierarchical models show that partisan identification among California officers significantly predicts support for rehabilitation as an ideology. Those who identify as Republicans are less supportive of a rehabilitation philosophy than those who identify as Democrats (see Figure 5). Compared to those who identify as Democrats, being Republican predicts a decrease




FIG. 5 Effect of party identification on Ideology and Programs Indices, by state (HLM).

of 5 percentage points on the *Ideology Index*. Partisan differences in California on the question of rehabilitation programmes are somewhat smaller, though still statistically significant. Republicans are less likely to support offering rehabilitation programmes to inmates who want them than are Democrats (a gap of about three points).

Compared to California, where partisanship is a salient predictor of support for both a rehabilitation-focused correctional philosophy and support for rehabilitation programs, in Minnesota there is a lack of variation across partisan groups.⁹ Partisan identification is *not* significant in the Minnesota models predicting support for either dimension of rehabilitation. In Minnesota, both indices are better predicted by officer demographics, as well as features of the institution in which officers work.

Discussion

In this study, we have examined the role of party identification and state political context in shaping the attitudes of prison officers. Our results not only indicate a meaningful relationship between officers' partisan identifications and professional orientation, but also suggest that the effects of partisanship are conditional on the broader political environment in which prisons are situated. Specifically, we find that political dynamics in California and Minnesota help to explain contemporary prison officers' perspectives on rehabilitation as a central goal of imprisonment (vis-à-vis more punitive orientations). In contrast, party identification is a weaker predictor of officers' attitudes towards specific rehabilitation programmes. Instead, officers' orientations towards rehabilitation on this second dimension are better explained by other demographics and factors that are common to prison work across the two states.

These results are robust to various modelling specifications. However, the sizes of the coefficients on partisanship are relatively small, raising potential questions about their substantive importance. We would therefore emphasize that the magnitude of the partisan effect is notable relative to the predictive power of other variables that are more commonly included in models of officers' orientations towards correctional work. As we

⁹ An exception is Independent, which predicts about a 3 per cent increase on the *Programs Index*.

detailed in [Table 2](#), while being a Republican relative to a Democrat in California predicts a decrease on the *Ideology Index* of 5 percentage points, all else equal, being white relative to black in that state predicts a decrease of just 3 percentage points ($p < 0.001$), all else equal. Similarly, in the models with full controls, being male relative to female decreases support by just 4 points ($p < 0.001$).

In addition, even relatively small differences in scores on the *Ideology Index* are predictive of meaningful differences in how officers evaluate their personal contact with prisoners, as well as how they evaluate the overall quality of relationships between inmates and staff at the prison where they work (see [Table 3](#)). On both the CCOS and MNCOS, we asked officers: 'In general, how would you describe your interactions with inmates at the prison where you work?' In hierarchical models, we find that the *Ideology Index* and the *Programs Index* are each positively associated with more positive evaluations of staff–inmate interactions. In California, a positive shift from the bottom to the top of the *Ideology Index* is predictive of a shift of about 4 percentage points on a measure that ranges from 'not as pleasant as most other officers' to 'more pleasant than most other officers' ($p < 0.01$). A shift in the *Programs Index* has a similarly positive and even stronger association, predicting a 10 percentage point shift on this scale ($p < 0.001$). In Minnesota, the relationship between these indices and assessments of an officer's own relationship with inmates follows a similar pattern (9 percentage points for *Ideology*, $p < 0.05$; fully 18 percentage points for *Programs*, $p < 0.001$).

These correlations are compelling. However, they may simply reflect cognitive constructs that tend to pair together. That is, officers may want to believe they are personally more pleasant towards inmates, because they generally believe prisons should be more focused on rehabilitation. This is an important psychological association, but it does not mean that differences in officers' actual behaviour necessarily follow or that the relationships between inmates and officers actually differ across officers or institutions where support for rehabilitation is higher.¹⁰

TABLE 3 Predicting officer perceptions of inmate/staff relationships, by state (HLM)

	California	Minnesota
Index		
Ideology	0.04*** (0.01)	0.09* (0.04)
Programs	0.10*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.05)
Institutional characteristics		
Security level	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)
Female institution	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.03)
Intercept	0.33*** (0.02)	0.28*** (0.06)
BIC	-3,916.019	-470.386
Number of institutions	32	8

The tables shows the results of two-level hierarchical linear models with officers nested within institution. Models are estimated separately for each state. Both DVs are recoded to range from 0 to 1.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

¹⁰ [Crewe et al. \(2011\)](#) demonstrate that the relationship between attitudes and behaviour is not always straightforward. They show that competence and professionalism (which are related to experience and staffing ratios) mediate between staff orientations and practices. Officers who express 'traditional-professional' attitudes are 'not necessarily sympathetic towards prisoners', but because they are capable and professional, they facilitate 'high levels of safety, fairness, and service delivery'. Their analysis suggests that officers with positive views about prisoners and a rehabilitative orientation toward imprisonment may not be able to act on their attitudes because of organizational obstacles. These findings suggest caution when thinking about the relationship between behaviour and attitudes, particularly as expressed through interviews or surveys (on this topic, see [Jerolmack and Khan 2014](#)).

More direct evidence of this can be gleaned by examining the correlations between our two key indices and a set of administrative outcomes. In particular, we are interested in the extent to which higher average scores on the *Ideology Index* and the *Programs Index* are associated with actual reductions in violence between inmates and staff. To assess this question, we rely on three measures of inmate/staff violence taken from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's CompStat statistical reports: number of assaults on staff (per 100 staff), number of battery on staff (per 100 staff) and number of documented use of force incidents (per 100 inmates). Data are available for 23 prisons in California and are calculated per prison per year.¹¹

We correlate these measures with our two indices, which we aggregate to the institution level in three different ways: mean scores at each prison, the per cent of officers at each prison with scores above 0.75 and the per cent of officers at each prison with scores below 0.25. We find that all three measures of inmate/staff violence correlate with support for rehabilitation among prison officers (see Table 4). The *Ideology Index* appears most strongly associated with the frequency of assaults on staff, while the *Programs Index* is correlated more strongly with the use of force by officers against inmates.

These are simple correlations only, and we would caution against making too much of the relationships we see here. In particular, we know that a variety of institutional characteristics might predict both support for rehabilitation and violence within the prison. However, many of these potentially confounding factors—the types of educational and drug treatment programmes offered at a prison, the availability of inmate work assignments, the criminal histories of inmates and the prevalence of gangs—are correlated with the security level of a prison (Lerman 2013). Therefore it reassures that we continue to see evidence of significant relationships between officers' support for rehabilitation and measures of violence in a multivariate context, when we control for security level. (Details of these regression models are provided in Appendix B.)

Even accounting for the proportion of inmates who are designated at Level IV or III relative to II or I (high or medium custody relative to low or minimum), we find that the use

TABLE 4 *Correlations between aggregate officer support for rehabilitation and administrative measures of inmate/staff violence*

	Assault on staff	Battery on staff	Use of force
Ideology Index			
Mean	-0.371 [#]	-0.134	-0.329
Per cent below 0.25	0.451*	0.056	0.259
Per cent above 0.75	-0.404 [#]	-0.194	-0.371 [#]
Programs Index			
Mean	-0.319	-0.398 [#]	-0.583**
Per cent below 0.25	-0.282	-0.304	-0.054
Per cent above 0.75	-0.343	-0.421*	-0.640***

N = 23 prisons.

[#]p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed).

¹¹ Assaults and Batteries on staff are taken from CDC-1154 Disciplinary Action Logs. Use of force statistics are drawn from 'every reportable incident that occurred during the reporting period at each institution for which a CDC 837 Crime/Incident Report was completed' where '837 Field Name - Type of Weapon/Shots Fired/Force: Any selection other than 'N/A'' (CompStat 2012). Unfortunately, equivalent data are not available for Minnesota prisons. We therefore conduct this analysis for California only.

of force goes down as support for rehabilitation programmes increases, and the frequency of assaults by inmates on staff goes up as support for a rehabilitation-oriented correctional ideology declines. Combined with our other analyses, these results provide strong suggestive evidence in support of the contention that officers' attitudes matter not just for officers themselves, but also because they may have instrumental implications for how officers do their job within the prison. This adds in important ways to previous works that have made a similar claim (Lipsky 1980; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003; Meir and Nicholson-Crotty 2006; Liebling 2008; Maynard-Moody and Portillo 2010; Liebling et al. 2011).

Conclusion

In sum, our findings indicate that the unique political histories of state prison systems matter for the relationship between partisanship and prison officer attitudes. Put simply, our cross-state comparison shows that there is not a straightforward, universal relationship between political party identification and officer perceptions; state-level political context strongly affects this relationship. This supports Melossi's claim that social control is 'embedded' in specific 'cultural traditions' (2001). However, we extend this finding by showing that, at least in two American states, social control is also embedded in particular *political contexts*.

The analyses presented here offer directions for a robust research agenda. In future studies, scholars might productively examine the political context of other states, where there are other markers and degrees of politicized correctional culture. We also hope to gather data that allow for cross-national comparisons between the United States and other countries. As scholars have noted, imprisonment (and punishment more generally) in the United States is especially political compared to other western industrial democracies, due largely to the decentralized and democratic nature of criminal punishment in this country (Savelsberg 1994; Sutton 2000; Whitman 2003). Both interstate and international comparative projects would significantly extend the work we have done here, by adding additional cases to our analysis. In addition, we would be well-served to examine how partisanship and politicization shape the attitudes of other correctional staff, including parole officers, correctional counselors and prison educators, as well as to more thoroughly explore the relationships among political context, partisanship and the *behaviour* of individual prison officers and other prison workers. Given our results, these all promise to be fruitful areas for further inquiry.

Along with offering directions for future research, our results make a substantial contribution to an important literature. Most basically, our findings locate a key and heretofore neglected predictor of prison officers' orientations: their political partisanship. More broadly, though, our study suggests that the hyper-politicization of American imprisonment since the late 1960s encourages prison officers to view critical carceral issues in political terms. In other words, struggles in the political field seep into the prisons, affecting how officers understand and, ultimately, carry out their work. In this regard, prisons are not autonomous institutions buffered from politics, but are firmly rooted in the broader political environments that gave rise to them.

We find this particularly troubling given recent literature on the US federal bureaucracy, which demonstrates that more politicized organizations (at least as measured by the relative proportion of political appointees) do not perform as well, on average, as those that remain more insulated from political pressures (Gilmour and Lewis 2006;

(Lewis 2007), and related scholarship that finds politicization of the bureaucracy shapes policy outputs, not always in intended ways (Randall 1979; Wood and Waterman 1991). Additionally, individuals in agencies that are more politicized tend to be less satisfied with their workplaces and managers (Bertelli and Lewis 2013), a problem that is likely to be especially significant in light of the staffing shortages and high turnover rates that are already experienced by many prison systems.

To the extent that these results hold at the state level, this study should provide substantial support to those who advocate for implementing policies and designing institutions that decrease penal populism, insulating criminal justice from moral panics and electoral politics. Zimring et al. (2001), Tonry (2004) and Frase (2005) argue for de-politicizing sentencing policy through the use of semi-autonomous, expert commissions—as an alternative to the ballot initiative process and complement to the legislature process. Tonry (2004) also suggests that judges and district attorneys should be civil service appointees (as is the case in Western European countries), rather than elected officials.

Decreasing the politicization of imprisonment could simultaneously further the professionalization of the prison bureaucracy. Officers embedded in less partisan criminal justice contexts might be less likely to view the purpose of imprisonment and related matters as partisans, and be more likely instead to view themselves as civil servants tasked with carrying out their agency's mission—even if that means altering the purpose of imprisonment from incapacitation to rehabilitation. Enhancing professionalism among prison staff is important, because as Crewe et al. (2011) argue, professionalism (along with competence) can mediate between attitudes and behaviour; therefore, professionally oriented officers can have punitive attitudes *and* promote safety, fairness and the delivery of services to inmates. De-politicizing imprisonment, then, could improve conditions for workers and prisoners alike, as well as lead to better penal outcomes, enhancing public safety and the common good.

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Appendix A: OLS and HLM Control Variable Survey Questions

Partisanship	Do you consider yourself a: Republican, Independent, Democrat, Other Party, No Party
Republican	
Independent	
Officer demographics	Which category best describes your ethnicity? (check all that apply): American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African American, Hispanic/Latino, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, White/Caucasian, Other
White	
Female	What is your sex?: Female, Male
Age	In what year were you born?
Education	What is the highest level of education you have attained so far?: GED or High School degree, Some college (no degree), Associate's degree, Bachelor's degree, Masters degree, PhD, Advanced professional degree (medical, law, etc.)
Tenure DOC	In what year did you begin working for the Department of Corrections?
Institutional security	In your opinion, what percentage of the inmates at this security level do you think are very dangerous?
% Very dangerous	How likely do you think it is that a staff member would be assaulted at this prison?: Not at all likely, Somewhat likely, Likely, Very likely, Not sure
Likelihood staff assault	Over the past six months, how often has any type of violent incident occurred at this prison?: Never, Very rarely, Rarely, Now and then, Often, Very often, All the time
Freq violent incidents	What percentage of inmates would you say is involved in gangs or gang activity?
% Inmates in gangs	
Institutional management	I receive the kind of training that I need to perform my job well.
Sufficient job training	Strongly disagree, Disagree, Undecided, Agree, Strongly agree
Help with work problems	When I have a problem at work, there is someone I can talk to who will really help me to solve it. Strongly disagree, Disagree, Undecided, Agree, Strongly agree
Institutional characteristics	
Security level	With what security-level inmates have you worked most often during the past six months?: I, II, III, IV, IV (MN only)
Female institution	Female, Male, Both (administrative codes)
% White officers	0–100 (administrative codes)

Appendix B: Predicting Officer/Inmate Violence

	Assault on staff	Battery on staff	Use of force			
Ideology Index						
Per cent above 0.75	-0.08* (0.05)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.02 (0.02)			
Programs Index						
Per cent above 0.75	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.123* (0.068)	-0.02** (0.01)			
Per cent level III/IV	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.010 (0.017)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00* (0.01)	0.00* (0.00)
Intercept	2.06* (1.10)	1.52* (0.61)	7.261* (3.042)	2.92 (1.86)	1.16*** (0.04)	0.42* (0.21)
Adj R ²	0.06	0.10	0.111	0.02	0.44	0.19
	Assault on staff	Battery on staff	Use of force			
Ideology Index						
Per cent below 0.25	0.10* (0.05)	0.01 (0.16)	0.02 (0.11)			
Programs Index						
Per cent above 0.25	-0.27 (0.18)	-0.832 (0.521)	-0.03 (0.06)			
Per cent level III/IV	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.022 (0.016)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Intercept	0.99* (0.41)	0.06 (0.43)	3.071* (1.162)	1.98 (1.36)	0.24 (0.14)	0.11 (0.16)
Adj R ²	0.07	0.16	0.083	-0.03	0.14	0.17
	Assault on staff	Battery on staff	Use of force			
Ideology Index						
Mean	-7.66 (4.65)	-6.34 (14.09)	-2.15 (1.58)			
Programs Index						
Mean	-7.82 (6.46)	-29.90 (17.92)	-5.21* (1.90)			
Per cent level III/IV	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.018 (0.01)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	
Intercept	6.35 (4.72)	4.55* (2.39)	23.83* (13.10)	5.26 (7.25)	4.00** (1.39)	1.30 (0.81)
Adj R ²	0.04	0.10	0.09	-0.02	0.37	0.20